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Abstract In this paper, I investigate the relationship between preference and
judgment aggregation, using the notion of ranking judgment introduced in List and Pet-
tit (Synthese 140(1–2):207–235, 2004). Ranking judgments were introduced in order
to state the logical connections between the impossibility theorem of aggregating sets
of judgments proved in List and Pettit (Economics and Philosophy 18:89–110, 2002)
and Arrow’s theorem (Arrow, Social choice and individual values, 1963). I present a
proof of the theorem concerning ranking judgments as a corollary of Arrow’s theorem,
extending the translation between preferences and judgments defined in List and Pettit
(Synthese 140(1–2):207–235, 2004) to the conditions on the aggregation procedure.
Keywords Arrow’s theorem · Conodorcet’s paradox · Discursive dilemma ·
Aggregation of ranking judgments · First order logic
1 Introduction
Doctrinal paradoxes show how the task of producing a rational collective judgment
out of individual rational judgments, see Kornhauser and Sager (1986), may lead to
inconsistency. This type of paradoxical outcomes was generalized in a theorem con-
cerning the impossibility of aggregating sets of logically connected judgments in List
and Pettit (2002). Since then, the relationship between Arrow’s theorem and this new
result has become an interesting theme in the debate on the possibility of collective
choices.
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The result in List and Pettit (2002) states that it is not possible to define a procedure
that aggregates rational sets of judgments to produce a rational collective outcome and
satisfies some reasonable democratic features.
As this theorem resembles Arrow’s result, it is interesting to see whether it is simply
a version of Arrow’s theorem or rather a different result, dealing with a different kind
of aggregation dynamic.
In Dietrich and List (2007), a proof of Arrow’s theorem is proposed within the
framework of judgments; here, we compare the two impossibility results from the
opposite direction: namely, we investigate whether we can prove properties of judg-
ment aggregation using Arrow’s theorem.
We will consider a particular type of judgment aggregation problem in order to
show that it can be described precisely by the properties involved in Arrow’s theorem.
List and Pettit (2004) use the concept of ranking judgments to embed the frame-
work of preferences into the framework of judgments, and investigate the logical
relationship between Arrow’s theorem and the impossibility theorem on judgments.
They prove an impossibility result for ranking judgments, which demonstrates the
logical connection with Arrow’s reasoning.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Sect. 2, I recall the definitions involved
in Arrow’s theorem. Section 3 contains an example of a doctrinal paradox, and the
impossibility theorem on aggregating judgments. In the fourth section, I discuss the
proposal of List and Pettit (2004) and the notion of ranking judgments. Section 5 con-
tains the proof of the impossibility theorem for aggregating sets of ranking judgments
as a corollary of Arrow’s theorem. Finally, I point to some applications of the con-
nection between logic and preference theory that are suggested by the translation via
ranking judgments.
2 Arrow’s theorem
We briefly recall the notions involved in Arrow’s theorem, see Arrow (1963). We use
the notation ≤ and < for weak and strong preference relations, respectively.
Assume there is a finite set N of individuals, and a finite set X of alternatives. A
preference order of an individual i ∈ N over X , is a relation ≤i on X that satisfies
the following properties: (1) reflexivity: for any x in X x ≤i x ; (2) transitivity: for any
x, y and z in X , if x ≤i y and y ≤i z, then x ≤i z; (3) connectedness: for any x , for
any y, x ≤i y or y ≤i x .
A profile of preference orders is a function form N to the set of all strict preference
orders on X ; we denote it {≤1, . . . ,≤n} or {≤i }i∈N .
As in Arrow (1963), we can define a strong preference order, by considering equiv-
alence classes of indifferent alternatives, namely those alternatives x and y such that
x ≤ y and y ≤ x hold. We can then define the relation “strictly preferred” on equiva-
lence classes; we denote the strong preference <i .
A strict preference order can also be defined directly by the properties of: irreflex-
ivity (x < x does not hold for any x), transitivity, and completeness (for all x for all
y, if x = y, then x < y or y < x).
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Arrow’s theorem is concerned with the following problem: is it possible to aggregate
individual preference orders into a collective preference order that keeps track of the
individuals in a suitable way?
The process of aggregation is formally represented by a function F (social welfare
function) that takes a profile of preference orders as input and produces as output
a single preference order, considered the collective one, satisfying some conditions
intended to describe the concept of a democratic choice.
These conditions are formally expressed by the following properties.1
We present Arrow’s theorem for strict preferences. Let <i denote the individual
preference orders in a profile in {<i }i∈N and <c the collective preference order result-
ing from the application of F :
– Universal domain (U): the domain of F is the set of all preference profiles {<i }i∈N
over alternatives in X .
– Weak Pareto principle (P): Given a profile in {<i }i∈N , if for every i in N , x <i y,
then x <c y.




i∈N are two pro-
files of preference orders, and x, y are two alternatives in X such that, for all
individuals i in N , x <i y if and only if x <′i y, then x <c y if and only if x <′c y.
– Non-Dictatorship (D): There does not exist an individual i in N such that, for all
profiles of preference orders, if x <i y, then x <c y.
If we assume that the set N contains at least two individuals and if the set X contains
at least three alternatives, then Arrow’s theorem (Arrow 1963) states that there is no
function that satisfies the above properties.
Theorem 2.1 There is no function F satisfying (U ), (P), (I ) and (D), that generates
a collective preference order.
3 Discursive dilemma
The theorem proved in List and Pettit (2002) concerns the impossibility of aggregating
individual sets of judgments in a coherent and democratic way.
As Arrow’s theorem can be considered as a generalization of Condorcet’s para-
dox to any aggregation procedure satisfying some democratic conditions, the theorem
about judgments can be seen as a generalization of situations known as doctrinal
paradox or discursive dilemma. This type of voting paradoxes have actually emerged
in the deliberative practice of collegial courts,2 and they constitute a challenge for
those theories of democracy that stress the deliberative features of making collective
decisions.
1 For a discussion of these properties, see Arrow (1963). See also List and Pettit (2004) for a comparison
of these properties and those involved in judgments framework.
2 See Kornhauser (1992).
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A discursive dilemma can be stated as follows. Suppose there are three individu-
als labelled 1, 2 and 3, and there are propositions α, β and α ∧ β. Suppose that the
individuals judge the propositions involved in the following way.
α β α ∧ β
1: true true true
2: false true false
3: true false false
Each individual holds a coherent set of judgments, but if we aggregate the three
sets of judgments by majority rule, we would obtain that α is collectively judged to
be true, β is collectively true, but α ∧ β is judged to be false, which contradicts the
meaning of conjunction.
Generalizing this type of configurations leads to the formulation of an impossibility
theorem on the aggregation of sets of judgments.
For a precise discussion, see List and Pettit (2002, 2004); here we simply state the
result.
Suppose we have a set N of individuals and a set J of propositions that contains
at least two atomic propositions p and q and at least the conjunction p ∧ q and its
negation ¬(p ∧ q).
Given an individual i in N , an individual set of judgments Ji is assumed to satisfy
the following three conditions: (1) completeness: for all propositions φ in J , either
φ or ¬φ is in Ji ; (2) consistency: there is no proposition φ in J such that φ and ¬φ
are in Ji ; (3) deductive closure: if Ji entails a proposition ψ in J , then ψ is also
contained in Ji .
A profile of sets of judgments is a function form N to the set of all sets of judge-
ments over J , containing one set of individual judgments for each individual in N .
We denote it {J1 , . . . , Jn }, or also {Ji }i∈N .
The conditions on the judgment aggregation function F J , which takes as input pro-
files of individual judgments and gives as output a single set of judgments representing





: The domain of F J is the set of all profiles of complete,
consistent and deductively closed individual sets of judgments.
Anonymity (AJ ): For any {Ji }i∈N in the domain of F J and any permutation σ :
N → N , F({Ji }i∈N ) = F({Ji }σ(i)∈N ).
Systematicity (S J ): There exists a function g : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} such that, for any
{Ji }i∈N in the domain of F J , F J ({Ji }i∈N )={φ ∈J : g(δ1(φ),. . . ,δn(φ)) = 1}
where, for each i ∈ N and each φ ∈ J , δi (φ) = 1 if φ ∈ Ji and δi (φ) = 0 if
φ /∈ Ji .3
We can now state the impossibility result on the aggregation of judgments (List and
Pettit 2002):
3 The systematicity condition intuitively means that the aggregation procedure depends only on the pattern
of yes and no expressed by individuals on a given judgment.
123 [80]
Synthese (2010) 173:199–210 203
Theorem 3.1 There exists no judgment aggregation function FJ generating complete
consistent and deductively closed collective sets of judgments, which satisfies (U J ),
(AJ ) and (S J ).
4 The impossibility theorem on the aggregation of ranking judgments
An interesting issue that emerged in the debate on deliberative democracy after the
work of List and Pettit is the problem of stating the relationship between the two
impossibility results we recalled. The theory of deliberative democracy may also be
considered as a way to deal with the inconsistencies underlined by Arrow’s impossibil-
ity result, introducing deliberative aspects that be considered more apt for discussion
and revision, but also agreement.4
Therefore, the question whether there is a difference between the aggregation of
preferences and the aggregation of judgments is itself relevant to deliberative democ-
racy, since it is important to find out whether we are considering the same kind of
aggregation problem or not.5
In order to compare Arrow’s theorem with Theorem 3.1, List and Pettit6 introduce
the concept of ranking judgment to represent preference orders by means of sets of
sentences in first order logic.
Consider the following example of Condorcet’s paradox, with three alternatives,
a, b and c, and three voters 1, 2 and 3:
1: a < b < c
2: b < c < a
3: c < a < b
Majority rule leads us to accept a < b and b < c, so by transitivity we conclude
a < c too; however, by majority, we also have c < a, so by transitivity again, from
a < c and c < a, we get a < a, which contradicts the irreflexivity of strong preference.
In order to define ranking judgments from individual orders, we need to represent
the relation <i using a logical relational constant, say P; we can translate a profile of
preference order into a set of judgments in the following way.
Given the set of alternatives X = {a, b, c}, we can represent these alternatives using
constants of the language of first order logic, and denote them by a¯, b¯, c¯, respectively.
We can translate the preference orders of individuals 1, 2, and 3 into the following
three sets of judgments:
1: a < b < c {a¯ Pb¯, b¯Pc¯, a¯ Pc¯} = 1
2: b < c < a {b¯Pc¯, c¯Pa¯, b¯Pa¯} = 2
3: c < a < b {c¯Pa¯, a¯ Pb¯, c¯Pb¯} = 3
4 See Dryzek and List (2003).
5 For a discussion of the relevance of the discursive dilemma in deliberative democracy, see List and Pettit
(2002) and also Ottonelli (2005, 2009).
6 List and Pettit (2004).
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Following (List and Pettit 2004), we call this type of judgments ranking judgments.
It is important to remark that, if we aggregate such sets of judgments by majority
voting, as we did before with preferences, we obtain no contradiction: by majority we
get a¯ Pb¯, b¯Pc¯ and c¯Pa¯, which from a logical point of view are just atomic sentences;
in order to show that such set is coherent, we only need to define a model in which
they are true.
Therefore, to represent Condorcet’s paradox, we need to assume that the relational
constant P satisfies the properties describing strong preference order.7
The properties required can be stated as follows: irreflexivity: (Irr): ∀x¬x Px , transi-
tivity: (Tra): ∀x∀y∀z(x Py∧y Pz → x Pz), completeness: (Com): ∀x∀y(x Py∨y Px).
Assuming these properties we get the following sets:
1: {a¯ Pb¯, b¯Pc¯, a¯ Pc¯} ∪ {(Irr), (Tra), (Com)}
2: {b¯Pc¯, c¯Pa¯, b¯Pa¯} ∪ {(Irr), (Tra), (Com)}
3: {c¯Pa¯, a¯ Pb¯, c¯Pb¯} ∪ {(Irr), (Tra), (Com)}
In this way it is possible to represent an instance of Condorcet’s paradox in the
form of a doctrinal paradox, obtaining a contradiction between judgments, for exam-
ple, between (Irr) and a¯ Pa¯.
By generalizing the above argument on the relationship between Condorcet’s para-
dox and discursive dilemmas, List and Pettit (2004) present an impossibility theorem
on the aggregation of ranking judgments.
Let N be a set of individuals, with at least two members, and let X be a set of alter-
natives with at least three elements. Every individual i ∈ N holds a strong preference
order <i over X , where <i satisfies irre f lexivi t y, transi tivi t y and completeness.
Moreover the collective order <c is also assumed to be a strong preference order.
We define a theory for ranking judgements, in order to state precisely the relation-
ship with preference orders.
We define the alphabet for ranking judgments, as a subset of the alphabet of first
order logic. It contains a finite number of individual constants Constr j = {a1, . . . , an}
and variables V arr j = {x1, . . . , xn} and a single predicative constant P .
The language of ranking judgments Lr j is defined as a (finite) fragment of the
language of first order logic containing atomic sentences of the form ai Pa j , where ai
and a j belong to Constr j , and it is closed by the usual definition of first order well
formed sentences.8
7 This is required if we want to represent orders by means of first order logic. Moreover it also seems to be
assumed in List and Pettit (2004, pp. 9–10), when they translate an instance of Condorcet’s paradox using
sets of sentences of first order logic.
8 The set of ranking judgments was defined in List and Pettit (2004) as follows: r j = {x Py : x, y ∈
X, x = y}. We remark that in that case we are simply stating the fact that x and y are different variables, so
there is some ambiguity on the use of variables: it doesn’t mean that we can exclude judgments of the form
a Pa by simply stating that, in x Py, we assume two different names for options. In the definition we pro-
pose, the fact that individual sets of judgments contain no sentences of the form a Pa will be a consequence
of the logical conditions on those sets. Moreover, in List and Pettit (2004), individual judgments are simply
of the form a Pb, while here we assume also that the set of issues of the aggregation problem represented
by Lr j may contain complex proposition. In order to state the theorem on ranking judgments exactly as
it was presented in List and Pettit (2004), we could define the language of ranking judgments as follows
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The relationship between preference orders and ranking judgments is stated in the
following definition.
Definition 4.1 Let (X,<) be a preference order, where < may be <i or the collective
<c, and <⊂ X × X is irreflexive, transitive and complete.
1. We define an injective function tc : X −→ Constr j assigning a name to each
option in X ;
2. We define a function tR : {<} −→ {P} associating to each preference relation <
the relational constant P;
3. We assume that (x, y) ∈<i iff tc(x) P tc(y) ∈ i .
4. Given <, we define a set of judgments
t (<) = {tc(a) P tc(b) : (a, b) ∈<} .
An individual i accepts a judgment x Py if and only if i ranks x below y in his
preference order.
In this framework, it is possible to reinterpret the conditions of irreflexivity, com-
pleteness and transitivity of ranking judgments as conditions on sets of judgments, as
they were stated in Theorem 3.1.
More precisely, we assume that the sets of ranking judgments are rational in the
following sense.9 We assume three axioms: (Irr), (Tra), (Com) and we can use as an
inference system any reasoning method for first order logic.
Let r j be an individual set of ranking judgments or the collective set. Assume the
following properties:
– Consistency: there is no φ ∈ Lr j such that both φ ∈ r j and ¬φ ∈ r j ,
– Completeness: for every φ ∈ Lr j , either φ ∈ r j or ¬φ ∈ r j ,
– Deductive closure: if φ ∈ Lr j and r j ∪{(Irr), (Tra), (Com)} | φ, then φ ∈ r j .
So we can define r ji and r j as the deductive closures of the sets t (<i ) and t (<c)
(with respect to the language Lr j ).
Given a set of ranking judgments r j , we can define a set equipped with a prefer-
ence relation as a model of the set r j :10 we can associate an order structure (X ,<),
interpreting the constants of r j as elements of X and interpreting P as <.
Footnote 8 continued
r j = {α : α ∈ Lr j and α is atomic} and restrict deductive closure to propositions of that form. However
it seems interesting to consider also propositions stating properties of preference relations as a matter of
deliberative discussion; in this way the judgments model can be considered a genuine generalization of the
descriptive features of the preference model.
9 In List and Pettit (2004), no particular deductive system is specified; here we can assume it is first order
logic. Actually we need less, namely we need only to apply instances of transitivity, so it would be enough
to assume rules for the elimination of universal quantifier and modus ponens.
10 We may here consider finite structures, since the set X of alternatives is a finite set. Therefore, we can
describe models of first order sentences up to isomorphism. Actually, we would need to add the first order
sentence stating the cardinality of the structure as an axiom.
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So we can define a function m from sets r j to their model (X,<).11
As in Arrow’s theorem, a profile of strong preference orders {<1, . . . , <n} is a
function from N to the set of strict orders on X , so we can obtain a profile of sets of
ranking judgments by taking the corresponding sets of judgments, say {r j1 , . . . , r jn }.
A ranking judgments aggregation function is a function f r j that takes profiles of
ranking judgments as input and produces as output a single set of ranking judgments.
We can restate the conditions on f r j in List and Pettit (2004) as follows:12
– Universal domain (ur j ): the domain of f r j is the set of all possible profiles of sets
of ranking judgments {r ji }i∈N .
– Anonymity (ar j ): For any {r ji }i∈N in the domain of f r j , and any permutation
σ : N −→ N , f r j ({r ji }i∈N ) = f r j ({r jσ(i)}i∈N ).
– Independence of non-welfare characteristics (inwr j ): Let {r ji }i∈N and {′r ji }i∈N
be two profiles of ranking judgments in the domain of f r j , and let x1 and y1
and x2, y2 be two pairs of alternatives in X such that, for all individuals i ∈
N , x1 Py1 ∈ r ji if and only if x2 Py2 ∈ ′r ji . Then x1 Py1 ∈ f r j ({r ji }i∈N ) if
and only if x2 Py2 ∈ f r j ({′r ji }i∈N ).13
We can now present the theorem on the impossibility of aggregating ranking
judgments.
Theorem 4.2 There exists no ranking judgments aggregating function f r j that satisfies
(ur j ), (ar j ) and (inwr j ).
5 Ranking judgments in Arrow’s setting
In this section we present a proof of Theorem 4.2 as a corollary of Arrow’s theorem.
The proof proposed here shows how the properties we assume to prove the theorem
on ranking judgments are related to the properties in Arrow’s result.
Before comparing the conditions at issue, we need to find a way to compare two
apparently different frameworks, namely the strict orders framework and the ranking
judgments framework.
In order to prove Theorem 4.2 as a corollary of Arrow’s theorem, we will show
that if the function f r j described in Theorem 4.2 exists, then we can define a function
11 Actually, m gives a representative of the equivalence class of models of r j modulo isomorphism
of order structures. The function is well defined since every finite structure is first order definable up to
isomorphism.
12 We remark that in List and Pettit (2004), the function f r j takes a strong preference order as input and
gives as output a strong preference order. Anyway, the proof of the theorem uses properties of sets of
judgments, in order to show how the mechanism of Theorem 3.1 can be applied to preference aggregation.
Therefore it seems more direct to define the function f r j directly on profiles of ranking judgments.
13 Here we didn’t require that xi = yi , since it is enough to assume the irreflexivity axiom and to assume
that each set of ranking judgments is consistent, complete and deductively closed in order to obtain that
a Pa doesn’t belong to each set. Moreover, we do not need to assume that y Px is the negation of x Py,
since if they both belong to a set of ranking judgments, it entails a contradiction.
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h( f r j ) that satisfies the conditions of Arrow’s theorem, and so Arrow’s social welfare
function would exist.
Let (inw), (a) and (u) be the translations of the conditions on f r j into the language
of preference orders.
Consider a function f that takes a profile of strong preference orders and returns a
collective strong preference order, which satisfies (inw), (a), (u).
The relationship between preference aggregation functions and ranking judgments
aggregation functions can be stated as follows.
We can define a function f by means of f r j and translations t and m defined above.
Given a function
f : (<1, . . . , <n) −→<
we can define









m×...×m−→ (<1, . . . , <n) f−→< t−→ r j .
Moreover, given f r j , we can define a function f in an analogous way. We can
prove the following proposition.
Proposition 5.1 A function f satisfies (inw) (respectively, (a), (u)) if and only if f r j
satisfies (inwr j ) (respectively, (ar j ), (ur j )). Moreover, if (I r j ), (Dr j ) and (Pr j ) are
the translations of (I ), (D), and (P) into the language of ranking judgments, then
a function f satisfies (I )((D), (P)) if and only if f r j satisfies (I r j ) ((Dr j ), (Pr j )
respectively).
Proof Consider for example (inw). We prove that if f satisfies (inw), then f r j satisfies
(inwr j ).
Assume that x1 Py1 ∈ r ji if and only if x2 Py2 ∈ ′r ji . Then by means of the
translation m, we have x1 <i y1 if and only if x2 <′i y2. Since f satisfies (inw), we
have (x1, y1) ∈ f ({<i }i ) if and only if (x2, y2) ∈ f ({<′i }i ). Applying the translation
t , we obtain x1 Py1 ∈ f r j ({r ji }) if and only if x2 Py2 ∈ f r j ({′r ji }). unionsq
As recalled in List and Pettit (2004), we have:
1. if f satisfies (inw), then f satisfies (I).
2. if f satisfies (a), then it satisfies (D).14
We prove that f r j satisfies (Pr j ), which is the translation of (P) into the language
of ranking judgments:
14 See also Pauly and van Hees (2006).
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Weak Pareto principle (Pr j ): if for all individuals i ∈ N , x Py ∈ r ji , then x Py
belongs to the collective set of ranking judgments f r j ({i }i∈N
)
.
We use the following property, proved in List and Pettit (2002, 2004), which holds
for any function satisfying (inwr j ) and (ar j ).15
Proposition 5.2 Let Nφ denote the set of individuals accepting a judgment φ ∈
Lr j , Nφ = {i : φ ∈ r ji } and |Nφ | the cardinality of Nφ . If |Nφ | = |Nψ |, then
φ ∈ f r j ({r ji }i∈N ) if and only if ψ ∈ f r j ({r ji }i∈N ).
We can now prove the following lemma.
Lemma 5.3 If f r j satisfies (inwr j ) and (ar j ), then f r j satisfies (Pr j ).
Proof Assume x Py belongs to each set of judgments r ji . Then |Nx Py | = |N |, i.e.,
everyone holds x Py. Since each set is deductively closed, we have that (Tra) belongs
to each set of judgments r ji (since (Tra) is an axiom). Thus, we have
|N∀x∀y∀z(x Py∧y Pz→x Pz)| = |N |
Therefore, we obtain
|Nx Py | = |N∀x∀y∀z(x Py∧y Pz→x Pz)|
Using Proposition 5.2, we infer that x Py belongs to the collective set of judgments
r j if and only if ∀x∀y∀z(x Py ∧ y Pz → x Pz) belongs to the collective set of
judgments r j .
Since the collective set r j is deductively closed, (T ra) ∈ r j . Therefore x Py is
in r j . Thus (Pr j ) holds.16 unionsq
We can now prove Theorem 4.2 as a corollary of Arrow’s theorem.
Theorem 5.4 There exists no ranking judgments aggregating function f r j that satis-
fies (ur j ), (ar j ) and (inwr j ).
Proof We show that if such an f r j exists, then we could build an aggregation function
h( f r j ) contradicting Arrow’s theorem.
Suppose by contradiction that f r j exists. So f r j is a function that takes profiles
of sets of ranking judgments and produces a collective set of judgments. Moreover,
f r j satisfies (ur j ), (ar j ) and (inwr j ). Define h( f r j ) : (<1, . . . , < n) −→< as the
composition m ◦ f r j ◦ t . Then by Proposition 5.1, h( f r j ) satisfies (inw), (a) and (u).
Since h( f r j ) is a function form preference profiles to preference orders, we have
that:
15 Actually, in List and Pettit (2002) the property we recalled is proved using (AJ ) and (S J ), and it holds
for sets of judgments of propositional logic. However, it is easy to adapt the proof in the case of (inwr j )
and the sets of judgements we are considering.
16 We can adapt this proof to the case in which individuals express their judgments only on propositions
of the form x Py, in order to match exactly the notion of ranking judgments in List and Pettit (2004). It is
enough to consider their deductive closure and prove the proposition on those sets.
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1. If h( f r j ) satisfies (inw), then h( f r j ) satisfies (I )
2. If h( f r j ) satisfies (a), then it satisfies (D).
By Lemma 5.3, we also have that if f r j satisfies (inwr j ) and (ar j ), then f r j satis-
fies (Pr j ).
Then we have that h( f r j ) satisfies (P).
So we have a function h( fr j ) from preference profiles to preference orders satisfy-
ing the conditions (I ), (D), (U ) and (P), which contradicts Arrow’s theorem. unionsq
So we can consider the theorem on ranking judgments as a particular case of Arrow’s
theorem: ranking judgments describe in a logical framework the aggregation procedure
for strong preference relations.
The aggregation inconsistencies for ranking judgments then seem to be the same
kind of problems shown by Condorcet’s paradox and Arrow’s theorem, with the main
difference being the logical interpretation. In order to state the relationship between
Theorem 4.2 and Arrow’s theorem, it is required to use the notion of ranking judgment
to define the (first order) theory of ordered sets of preferences.17
This approach points to two kinds of interesting applications, which may be inves-
tigated in future work. On the one hand, we can apply preference theory results to
judgment aggregation: for example, by considering models of sets of ranking judg-
ments satisfying the well known sufficient conditions avoiding cycles (such as single
peakedness or value restriction;18) since in the language Lr j is possible to express for
example properties like “the option a is not ranked first”, the logical interpretation of
these conditions would allow us to define a reasoning method to model situations in
which the propositions stating the properties of the preference relations are matter of
deliberation among voters.
Moreover, it is also possible to consider which kind of relations are likely to lead to
inconsistency, when we try to aggregate judgments over them: we considered the lan-
guage of ranking judgments as a fragment of first order logic, so we may ask whether
the impossibility result holds for wider fragments, namely for relations with different
constraints.
This would constitute a step towards a sort of generalization of the impossibility
theorem of aggregating judgments from propositional logic to predicate logic.
On the other hand, by means of the translation in List and Pettit (2004) we can
represent a Condorcet’s paradox using the language of ranking judgments; therefore,
we can investigate preference aggregation dynamics by means of logical notions: for
example, we can apply the procedure of merging sentences, which has been described
in Pigozzi (2006) for judgment aggregation, to preference aggregation.
17 It is also possible to prove Theorem 4.2 as a corollary of Arrow’s theorem by working directly on ordered
sets and show that (INW) and (A) entail (P) and (I). We can adapt the proof of Lemma 5.3 for preference
orders completing each preference order with a top ; considering a biconditional of the form (x, y) ∈<c
iff (z,) ∈<c , we can apply Proposition 5.2. However, I preferred to state the connection between Arrow’s
theorem and ranking judgements theorem as above for the following reason. This approach shows that in
the framework of ranking judgements it is required that sentences stating the constraints on preference
relations are common knowledge between individuals. I defined the set of ranking judgements as if there
were unanimity on transitivity, completeness and irreflexivity, but it is possible to consider partial agreement
on rationality constraints.
18 See List and Elsholtz (2005), for a compact presentation of the conditions avoiding cycles.
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